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The People's Republic of China's Ability to
Comply with the Standards Mandated
by the World Trade Organization
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 15th century, unrestricted access and unhampered utilization of
the vast Chinese market has been the Holy Grail for western economies.' The
acceptance of the People's Republic of China ("PRC" or "China") into the
World Trade Organization ("WTO"), which is progressing quickly at the time
of this writing, seems to be the last hurdle for American corporations in pur-
suit of this prize.2 However, American corporations will undoubtedly dis-
cover, as those did before them, that control of the market will be difficult to
obtain. 3
This gloomy outlook for American economic prospects in China stems
from the almost certain inability of China's central government to enforce
WTO standards throughout the country. 4 As a result of rapid decentralization,
Beijing no longer exerts the control it once did over China's twenty-three re-
gional provinces.5 While it may be Beijing's wishes that China open itself to
foreign trade, it is the local officials who govern these provinces who will
need to enforce WTO regulations. 6
In trying to enforce the WTO standards, these local officials will get little
help from the weak central government. 7 The local officials will be faced with
rising unemployment as state run businesses succumb to foreign competition,
and they will be faced with the lure of a more lucrative life engaging in local
protectionism. 8
The PRC's inability, or its provincial officials' reluctance, to comply with
the standards set by the WTO will place China in direct opposition with WTO
1. See generally Kevin Stemp, China & the WTO, at http://www.wcit.org/resources/wto archives/wto/post minsterial/wto-student-forum.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).2. See Greg Mastel, China and the World Trade Organization: Moving Forward WithoutSliding Backward, at http://Www.newaerica.net/articles/mastel/gm-IUSpring2000.htm (lastvisited Nov. 13, 2000); see also China to Enter WTO in the Near Term, at http://www.cnn.com/
2001/ WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/27china.wto.delay/index html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).3. Greg May, Reality Check: Local Protectionism May Hamper China's WTO Compli-ance, at http://www.nixoncenter.org/publicadons/Reality%20Check/1- 18-99ChinaWTO.htm
(last visited Nov. 22. 2002).
4. Id.
5. CIA-World Fact Book, at http:l/www.odci.gov/cia/publicationslfactbook/geoslch.html
(last visited Nov. 22, 2002); see also China's Decentralization Loosens Beijing's Control, athttp://www.tibet-ca/wtnarchive/1994/3/9-2-4.html; May, supra note 3.
6. See generally May, supra note 3.
7. See Chipia's Decentralization Loosens Beijing's Control, supra note 5; see generallyMay, supra rlote 3 (stating that China's central government has gone to the opposite extreme inthe reform Period abdicating much of its authority to local officials).
8. Id.
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Members, including its major trading partner, the United States.9 The result
could be WTO sponsored trade sanctions against China, and an irreconcilable
strain on Sino-American trade. 10 This Note illustrates the basis for PRC's
inability to comply with the regulations set by the WTO. The analysis of the
Note is done through a study of the current Chinese political and economic
climate, and through an overview of two major WTO agreements on trade.
Additional regulations, embodied in other WTO agreements, will undoubtedly
be significant in the area of China's compliance with WTO mandates. How-
ever, for the purposes of this Note, the focus is on the Agreement of Subsidies
& Countervailing Measures and the Agreement on Safeguards.
This Note also discusses two types of solutions the United States can seey
in order to protect its trade and influence China's development into a compli-
ant member of the WTO. While one solution is short-term and the other long-
term, both allow the United States to develop its vital interest in reaping the
full benefits of a free trade agreement with China.' ' Part II of this Note pro-
vides a brief background of China's recent economic history and its marct'
toward WTO acceptance. It also supplies a brief background on the WTO. It
addition, Part II fully discusses the recent economic and political climate it,
China and applies those factors to two major WTO agreements. By applying
these factors to the WTO agreements, this Note will demonstrate how Chinese
WTO non-compliance is likely to occur. Part III applies those factors to the
agreements for the Chinese auto industry to exemplify China's non-
compliance.
Finally, Part IV offers a short-term solution to Chinese non-compliance,
by discussing the ways in which the United States can utilize the WTO's di5-
pute resolution procedures.' 2 It also provides a long-term solution that call s
for a radical restructuring of the Chinese political body and calls for the cre-
tion of a joint Sino-American WTO compliance center.
II. CHINA AND WTO COMPLIANCE
A. Brief Background on China and the WTO
This Note would wax ambiguity if it proceeded with its discussion Of
China's compatibility with WTO standards without providing adequate bact ' -
ground. Therefore, a brief discussion of the political and economic climate Of
9. See generally May, supra note 3 (stating that it is Beijing's chronic inability to force its
will on localities that is perhaps the greatest challenge facing the WTO accord).
10. Id.; see also Sue Ann Mota, The World Trade Organization: An Analysis of Dispute- "
25 N.C.J. INr'L LAW & COM. REG. 77, 78 (1999).
1 1. See generally May, supra note 3 ("A similar re-centralization will need to occur in toe
court system and in the regulation of domestic trade if the foreign companies are to reap all tle
rewards of WTO."); Mota, supra note 10, at 78 ("The dispute resolution process under tl- e
WTO is particularly innovative, compared to prior processes, and contributes more to glob.%
1
economic stability than does any other aspect in the WTO.").
12. Mota, supra note 10, at 77.
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the PRC, both now and leading up to WTO accession, and a brief discussion
of the WTO framework is warranted.
Ever since European ships first brought direct trade to China in the 15th
century, Western industries have relentlessly pursued control of China's vast
market.' 3 This pursuit of economic spoils ended in 1949 with the Communist
victory. 14 Instilling the communist ideology, China closed down its market
and replaced its private companies and private sector employment with state
owned enterprises that were strictly controlled by the central government.' 5
In the late 1970s, China began to take the painful steps needed to change
its failing economy into a free-market system, like those utilized by the suc-
cessful nations in the western hemisphere.' 6 Encouraged by its success in ex-
porting to foreign markets, China sought membership to the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade ("GATT") in the mid-1980s, and later the
WTO in the mid-1990s.1 7 As in any case in which a country requests to join
the WTO, a working group was formed to consider the application.' 8 In
China's case, the working group included the United States, the European
Union, Japan, and Canada.19
The Final Act of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round 20 of the GATT is gener-
ally referred to as the WTO agreements.2 ' It includes, in part, agreements in
which individual countries, called "Members," have made binding commit-
ments to reduce or to eliminate specific tariffs and non-tariff barriers to mer-
13. See generally Stemp, supra note 1.
14. Id. at 1-2.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id.
18. See Mastel, supra note 2.
19. Id.
20. WTO legal texts: A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, at http://www.
wto.org/english/docs-e/egal-e/urusm-e.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2000).
'The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations', signed by ministers in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 is 550 pages long
and contains legal texts which spell out the results of the negotiations since the
Round was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. In addition to
the texts of the Agreements, the Final Act also contains texts of Ministerial Deci-
sions and Declarations which further clarify certain provisions of some agree-
ments. . . . The agreement establishing the [WTO] calls for a single institutional
framework encompassing the GATT, as modified by the Uruguay Round, all agree-
ments and arrangements concluded under its auspices and the complete results of
the Uruguay Round. Its structure is headed by a Ministerial Conference meeting at
least once every two years. A General Council oversees the operation of the agree-
ment and ministerial decisions on a regular basis. This General Council acts as a
Dispute Settlement Body and a Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which concern
themselves with the full range of trade issues covered by the WTO, and has also
established subsidiary bodies such as a Goods Council, a Services Council and a
TRIPs Council. The WTO framework ensures a 'signal undertaking approach' to
the results of the Uruguay Round.
21. Id.
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chandise trade.22 Membership in the WTO entails accepting all of the results
of the Uruguay Round without exception.
23
The WTO's "most favored nation principal" mandates that all WTO
Members receive the same treatment. 24 The concessions granted to one WTO
Member must be extended to all Members.25 Before a working group com-
pletes and sends a country's application to the WTO Council for final ap-
proval, the various bilateral understandings the applicant has reached with
each Member is fashioned into a single comprehensive multilateral agree-
ment.26 The bilateral understanding between China and the United States was
seen as the last hurdle in China's acceptance into the WTO.27 Since it was the
United States that expressed the most comprehensive reservations concerning
China's membership,28 it therefore seems highly likely that other Members
will soon reach agreements with China.2 9
B. Decentralization and Non-Compliance
China's impressive economic growth over the past decade has led to the
decentralization of economic control. 30 No longer is the central government
the omnipresent overseer of all commercial and economic activities. 3' Now,
much of the decision making process for operations, production, and invest-
ment has been delegated to the hundreds and thousands of local officials who
govern China's twenty-three provinces. 32 This decentralization process has
gone to a dangerous extreme and now threatens the PRC's ability to comply
with WTO regulations. 33
Experts on the PRC have stated that, "in some areas of economic policy,
Beijing can only pretend to rule the provinces, and the provinces only pretend
to be ruled by Beijing. '34 The result is that China, rather than being one vast
market, now seems to be a collection of small markets, each with its own
governing official and its own unique trade and investment barriers. 35 Beijing,
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See generally Mastel, supra note 2.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 3. Congress used the most favored nation vote as a way of expressing their dislike
with China's policies on things from human rights to arms sales.
29. Id.
30. See generally China's Decentralization Loosens Beijing's Control, supra note 5.
31. Id. (stating that Beijing only pretends to rule its provinces in many respects).
32. Stemp, supra note 1, at 3; see also CIA-World Fact Book, supra note 5; May, supra
note 3.
33. CIA-World Fact Book, supra note 5.
34. China's Decentralization Loosens Beijing's Control, supra note 5.
35. May, supra note 3.
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therefore, will need to ensure that all of these provincial officials comply with
the WTO agreements. 36
It is Beijing's chronic inability to enforce its will on these localities that is
the greatest challenge to China's compliance with WTO agreements. 37 For
example, Beijing was forced to abandon an economic austerity program soon
after its launch, because the central government was unable to impose the
program on the provinces. 38 This inability to control will be greatly com-
pounded by the fact that many of the WTO regulations will be painful to
implement. 39
For example, as a result of opening up the economy to foreign trade,
many uncompetitive Chinese factories will be shut down. Ten million farmers
alone could lose their jobs as superior U.S. sugar and wheat starts flooding
into the Chinese market.40 Many westerners try to offset this concern by in-
voking images of the Tiananmen Square movement, and incorrectly assuming
that young Chinese men and women will hold up Statute of Liberty figurines
and support the government programs that bring them closer to the west.4 1 In
other words, the west foolishly believes that many Chinese citizens will suffer
the immediate hardships, such as unemployment, in order to facilitate a greater
and more sustained movement toward capitalistic and democratic values.42
However, this is not the common sentiment of the average Chinese citi-
zen, and is certainly not the predominant attitude held by China's youth. 43 As
noted by Thomas Friedman, "The most popular political attitude among stu-
dents in China is nationalism, with an underlying sense that America is keep-
ing them down."44 This sense of nationalism may reach its boiling point as
China's youth observes foreign industries accumulating massive amounts of
wealth with little short-term visible benefit to China.45 As a result, many local
officials will find that embracing and enforcing Beijing's mandate of WTO
compliance is tantamount to political suicide. 46 Therefore, because of the na-
36. Id. (stating that hundreds and thousands of local officials will be responsible for com-plying with WTO rules on the ground). It is Beijing's chronic inability to force its will on these
localities that is its biggest challenge to WTO compliance.
37. Id.
38. China's Decentralization Loosens Beijing's Control, supra note 5.
39. See gelterally May, supra note 3 (stating that Opposition to trade liberalization amonglocal officials is understandable since they will have to deal with protests by angry laid-off
workers).
40. Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, The Five Myths, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 2000, at A12.
41. Id. (stating that a common myth is that every Chinese youth is building a replica of the
Statute of Liberty in his basement).
42. See generally id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at Al.
45. Id. (stating the most popular attitude among students in China is nationalism, with an
underlying sense that America is keeping them down).
46. Id.; see also May, supra note 3 (stating opposition to trade liberalization among local
officials is understandable since it is they, not the top leaders in Beijing, who will have to deal
2002] 617
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
tionalistic pressures, they will instead embrace the more popular principals of
regional protectionism. 47
Because of decentralization, these local officials now have the ability and
the power to effectively engage in local protectionism. 48 For instance, a local
official, fearing that a local business is going to succumb to foreign competi-
tion, will begin purchasing local goods over foreign goods in attempt to sup-
port the local industry and ward off political unrest. 49 Such a purchase would
violate the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM"). 5°
The SCM is contained in Annex I A., the Multilateral Agreements on
Trade in Goods, of the WTO.51 The SCM prohibits certain subsidies because
they violate the spirit of international trade and the free-market system. 52
They violate the spirit of the free-market system because they allow govern-
ments to interfere in the market and determine which industries/enterprises
survive, instead of leaving it for the market to determine. 53 This market deter-
mination is exactly what the Chinese provincial officials are going to try to
avoid by subsidizing the failing local industries. 54
Part I, Article 155 of the SCM contains a definition of subsidy. 56 A sub-
sidy, as defined, is (1) a financial contribution (2) by a government or any
with protests by angry laid-off workers. In that respect, provincial leaders in China are muchi
like the U.S. Congressmen who oppose free-trade agreements.).
47. Friedman, supra note 40; see also May, supra note 3 (stating local governments which
run their own business enterprises will try to protect their regional manufacturing, retail, and
service markets from outside competition, foreign and Chinese alike).
48. Friedman, supra note 40.
49. Id.
50. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations (Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/24-scm.pdf
[hereinafter Final Act]. Specifically, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
[hereinafter SCM Agreement], demonstrates that eleven WTO Members are signatories to the
SCM. in part I., art. 3.
51. LId. at 13. "The SCM is intended to build on the Agreement on Interpretation and Appli-
cation of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, which was negotiated in the Tokyo Round of GATT."
52. See The WTO in brief - 1, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewt-oe/whatise/inbr0le.
htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2000).
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See SCM Agreement, supra note 50, at part I, art. 1, which states:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)
(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within
the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as "government"), i.e.
where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g.
grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or
liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not col-
lected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits);
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infra-
structure, or purchases goods;
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public body within the territory of a Member, (3) which confers a benefit.
57
All three elements must be satisfied in order for it to be determined that a
subsidy existed. 58 The second element of a subsidy is easily satisfied in the
hypothetical above, as the provincial official is a governmental body.
To determine if the first element is satisfied, we look to the agreement's
definition of a financial contribution.59 The SCM lists the circumstances in
which a government has conferred a financial contribution.60 For example,
one of such circumstances would be if the governmental body provides goods
or services, other than for the general infrastructure, or if the governmental
body purchases goods.61 Pursuant to this definition of financial contribution,
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts
or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices nor-
mally followed by governments;
or
(a)(2)
there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of
GATT 1994;
and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. See WTO legal texts - A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note
20, at 2.
59. See SCM Agreement, supra note 50, at part I, art. 1.
60. Id.
In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph I of Article 1, is
specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to
in this Agreement as 'certain enterprises') within the jurisdiction of the granting
authority, the following principles shall apply:
(a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the
granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain en-
terprises, such subsidy shall be specific.
(b) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the
granting authority operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions gov-
erning the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not
exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and condi-
tions are strictly adhered to. The criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled
out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of
verification.
(c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the
application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are
reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may
be considered. Such factors are: use of a subsidy programme by a limited
number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the
granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises,
and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting author-
ity in the decision to grant a subsidy. In applying this subparagraph, account
shall be taken of the extent of diversification of economic activities within the
jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the length of time during
which the subsidy programme has been in operation.
61. See id.
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if the regional official purchases the goods from the local producer he would
have conferred a financial contribution.
The question of whether the third element, a benefit, exists can be un-
clear. 62 For example, the SCM does not provide language explaining when
loans and equity infusions would be considered a benefit.6 3 However, the cash
grant used to by the provincial officials to pay for the local goods is clearly a
benefit and would not fall into the areas afforded little guidance under the
SCM.64 Consequently, the last element is satisfied and a subsidy is deter-
mined to exist.
Part I, Article 2 of the SCM, introduces and explains the concept of speci-
ficity.6 5 This is relevant to our topic of discussion because all of the disci-
plines set out under the SCM apply to specific subsidies only (i.e., can be
challenged/prohibited by the WTO's regulations). 66 Article 2 provides princi-
pals that are to be applied in order to determine whether a subsidy is specific
to an industry or enterprise within the jurisdiction of a Member.67 One such
principal is if a subsidy is limited to certain enterprises located within a desig-
nated geographical region within the jurisdiction of a granting authority, then
the subsidy is specific. 68 It is this element of specificity that goes to the heart
of the principle of regional protectionism and would exist in the hypothetical
demonstrated above.69 The subsidy would be specific because the governmen-
tal official would have conferred the subsidy only on the failing business
within the regional province.
Given that not all subsidies are forbidden by the WTO, the SCM goes on
to create three main categories of subsidies: those that are prohibited, those
that are actionable, 70 and those that are non-actionable. 71 Actionable subsidies
may or may not be a violation of the WTO agreements and non-actionable
subsidies cannot be challenged in the WTO's dispute settlement procedures.
72
62. See SCM Agreement, supra note 50.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at part I, art. 2.
66. Id. at part I, art. 1. A subsidy as defined in paragraph I is subject to the provisions of
Part 3 or 5 only if such a subsidy is specific in accordance with Article II of the SCM.
67. Id. at part I, art. 2.
68. See id.
Provided these criteria and/or conditions are clearly spelled out in the law, regula-
tions or other official document governing them; Such factors include, use of a
subsidy program by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by
certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to
certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the
granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.
69. Id.; see generally May, supra note 3 (stating that provincial officials naturally favor
local manufactures).
70. See SCM Agreement, supra note 50. Actionable means subject to challenge in the
WTO, or may be subject to countervailing measures set under the SCM.
'71. See SCM Agreement, supra note 50.
"72. Id.
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For purposes of this discussion, we will only look at the first category of subsi-
dies: those that are prohibited, as they clearly violate the WTO agreements by
distorting international trade and causing serious injury to other Members.
Part II, Article 3 of the SCM states that two types of subsidies shall be
prohibited. 73 The first types are subsidies based upon export performance,
74
and the second are subsidies based upon the use of domestic over imported
goods. 75 It is this last definition of a prohibited subsidy that will become prev-
alent in China's economy after WTO accession.7 6 Hence, the provincial offi-
cial who chooses to save his faltering local industry by using government
funds to purchase domestic products over a foreign product would have used a
prohibited specific subsidy. Therefore, within the understanding of the SCM,
China is in violation of a WTO agreement and subject to sanctions.
In addition, a local official may become fearful that a local business is
going to succumb to foreign competition and not only subsidize the business,
but also enact safeguards to protect the local product.77 The enactment of such
safeguards is almost certainly a violation of an established WTO agreement,
the Agreement on Safeguards ("SG").
78
The SG 7 9 is also contained in Annex I A, the Multilateral Agreements on
Trade in Goods, of the WTO. 80 Section I of the SG states that the agreement
establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures. 81 Such measures
can consist of import restrictions or an increase on duties to higher than agreed
upon rates. 82 Therefore, the enactment of a safeguard by a local official in and
of itself would not be a violation of WTO principals. However, there are strict
elements and conditions that must be satisfied before the safeguard can be
enacted.
83
Article I of SG lays out the conditions under which a Member may apply
safeguards. 84 A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if
that Member has determined that such product is being imported into its terri-
73. See SCM Agreement, supra note 50, part II, art. 3.
74. Id. at part II, art. 3 (subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of
several other conditions, upon export performance).
75. See id. (subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon
the use of domestic goods over the use of imported goods).
76. See generally May, supra note 3 (stating that provincial officials naturally favor local
manufacturers).
77. See generally id. (stating local governments impose extra fees and taxes).
78. See id. and accompanying text note 77; see also Final Act, supra note 50, Agreement
on Safeguards [hereinafter SG Agreement].
79. See SG Agreement, supra note 78, at art. I. The purpose of the SG Agreement is to
clarify and reinforce the intent of Article XIX, Emergency Action on Imports of Particular
Products of the GATI 1994.
80. See id.
81. See SG Agreement, supra note 78, at part. I, para. 1.
82. See WTO: Trade Topics; The Agreement on Safeguards, at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/safege/safeint.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2000).
83. See SG Agreement, supra note 78, at art. II.
84. See id.
20021
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tory in increased quantities. 85 In addition, the imported product must threaten
to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces directly compet-
itive products. 86
Article IV of the SG explains that for purposes of the agreement, a seri-
ous injury shall mean a significant overall impairment in the position of a
domestic industry. 87 Such a threat of serious injury shall be understood to
mean serious injury that is clearly imminent. 88 The section further states that
a domestic industry shall be understood to mean the producers of the like or
directly competitive products operating within the territory of a Member.8 9
Article 3 of the SCM states the Member may apply the safeguard only
after an investigation by the competent authorities of that Member. 90 The sec-
tion also states that reasonable public notice must be given of the investigation
and that interested parties must be given the opportunity to present their views
and respond to the views of the Member seeking to impose the safeguard
measures.9 '
The requirement of an investigation poses an obstacle for the PRC in
enacting a safeguard. This obstacle arises because, although the importation
of foreign goods may indeed constitute a serious injury to a domestic industry
in China, the SG is predominately designed to protect countries, like the
United States, from having their markets flooded with (artificially low priced)
products made by cheap labor. 92 The SG is not designed to offer a remedy
from the competition of more efficient products or manufactures. 93 For exam-
ple, massive amounts of extremely cheap Chinese textiles shipped to the
United States in such a way that the United States textile industry cannot ef-
fectively compete, would cause a serious injury and may be actionable under
the SG.94 Conversely, under the theories of a free-market system, the more
efficient foreign product should force out the weaker Chinese domestic prod-
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See SG Agreement, supra note 78, at art. IV.
88. See id.
89. See id. Or those whose collective output of the like or directly competitive products
constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products.
90. See id. Pursuant to procedures established in Article X of the GATT 1994.
91. See SG Agreement, supra note 78, at part I, art. II. Interested parties include importers,
exporters, or producers.
92. See generally Enforcement of the U.S.-China WTO Accession Deal, at http://www.
whitehouse. gov/WH/New/html/20000308_3.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2000). (This ensures that
the U.S. can take effective action in case of increased imports of a particular product from China
that causes or threatens to cause or threaten to cause market disruption in the United States).
93. See SG Agreement, supra note 78 (recognizing the need to enhance rather than limit
competition in international markets).
94. See USTR on China WTO Accession before Senate Finance Committee (Urges support
for permanent Normal Trade Relations), at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/
barsh223.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2000).
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uct/producer, and therefore the enactment of a safeguard is not allowed to save
the industry. 95
In addition, much of the foreign imports flooding the Chinese market will
be at already agreed upon levels. 96 Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the
safeguard measures enacted by the regional officials to save a local industry
would survive the investigation mandated by the SG.
97
Assuming arguendo that the safeguard is found to be warranted by the
investigation, the Member must maintain a substantially equivalent level of
concessions and other obligations 98 with respect to affected Members. 99 This
aspect of the SG also poses a significant problem to China, and threatens their
ability to comply with the mandated regulations.' 00 Without a strong central
authority to decide which concession to grant, one local official will not be
able to make another local official accept the mandated concessions. 10 The
result would be a safeguard measure applied without an equivalent concession,
and therefore a violation of WTO standards. 1
02
III. AUTO INDUSTRY
The above-mentioned protectionist policies and the problems they create
under the WTO can be seen through an examination of the Chinese auto indus-
try. The potential for China's auto market is the largest in the world, but the
market is also highly protected by tariffs and non-tariff related policies.
10 3
Therefore, the WTO agreement between China and the United States calls for
Beijing to make drastic cuts in tariffs by 2006, with the largest cuts in the first
years after accession.1°4
In 1992, China's automotive industry employed 1.85 million people and
was a tremendous source of the country's revenue.' 0 5 Nonetheless, China's
auto industry is still highly inefficient and not fully capable of competing in
the international arena. 10 6 Consequently, the auto industry will be under a
95. See generally, supra note 88.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., SG Agreement, supra note 78, at art. IV.
98. See id. at art. VIII. Any adequate means of trade compensation may be agreed with the
affected Members.
99. See id.; see also WTO: Trade Topics; The Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 82.
Absent such agreement, the affected exporting Members individually may suspend substantially
equivalent concessions and other obligations.
100. See generally May, supra note 3 (stating that China is not really one market but a
collection of small markets).
101. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
102. See SG Agreement, supra note 78.
103. See Top Chinese Trade Official Says WTO Will Challenge China's Auto Industry, at
http://www.chinaonline.com/industry/automotive/NewsArchive/Secure/199. . /B2-99120622.
as.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2000).
104. See May, supra note 3.
105. See Top Chinese Trade Official Says WTO Will Challenge China's Auto Industry, supra
note 103.
106. See id.
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great deal of pressure from the tariff decreases and from the loosening of non-
tariff related policies that are mandated by the WTO agreement. 107 Therefore,
provipcial leaders may seek to protect their auto industry through the use of
local protectionist policies.10 8
The protectionist policies that local officials will use are identical to the
policies outlined in the previous section, and both will violate the WTO agree-
ments discussed above. 109 First, the official will offer subsidies to the local
car manufacturers, followed shortly by raising tariffs in order to make the
price of the foreign autos less attractive then the domestically manufactured
auto. 10
If the local factories falter and go bankrupt, the province would incur a
massive amount of unemployment and political unrest.' "I In order to prevent
the factory from going under, the local officials will attempt to give them
every advantage available.' 12 The words of a Chinese businessman attempting
to gain a contract in another Chinese province exemplify how often this oc-
curs. 1 13 One businessman stated, "When a local enterprise is desperate for
orders, the local government will naturally give it priority when there is com-
petition from outside companies."' 14 He went on to say, "Sometimes, we are
banned from participating in a bid at all."'
1 5
The Chinese auto market is one of the best examples of local protection-
ism occurring in China today. 1 6 It is here that one can see the continued use
of the previously mentioned prohibited specific subsidy.' 17 Provincial offi-
cials continually favor the purchase of locally manufactured autos over autos
produced outside their province. 18 This is why nearly every taxi in Shanghai
is made by the joint venture Shanghai Volkswagen." 9 Such an occurrence
under the WTO is tantamount to the government conferring a prohibited spe-
107. See id.
108. See generally May, supra note 3 (observing that China's auto market is one of the best
examples of localized protection).
109. See generally id. (stating that provincial and city officials naturally favor local car man-
ufacturers, and that many local governments impose extra fees and taxes on non-local cars).
110. See id. and accompanying text.
11. See generally May, supra note 3 (stating local officials who will have to deal with
protests by angry laid-off workers); see generally Top Chinese Trade Official Says WTO Will
Challenge China's Auto Industry, supra note 103 (stating China's auto industry employed 1.85
million people).
112. See generally May, supra note 3 (stating local officials will try to protect regional
manufacturing).
113. See Trish Sayweii, China's City Limits, (quoting the president of Baosteel Business
Development Co., Sun Dipeng), at http://www.feer.com/9910-14/p58economies.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 21, 2000).
114. See id.
115. See China's City Limits, supra note 113.
116. See May, supra note 3 (discussing the deal's highlight to reduce tariffs on foreign
autos).
117. See SCM Agreement, supra note 50.
118. See May, supra note 3.
119. See id.
[Vol. 21624
2002] PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 625
cific subsidy, and therefore, a serious violation of WTO regulations.' 20 While
these problems, until now, were primarily those of Chinese manufacturers, it is
almost certain that foreign companies will face the same obstacles.' 2'
Furthermore, as stated above, the local officials may seek to raise tariffs
to make the price of the locally produced cars more attractive than foreign
cars.122 This is equivalent to invoking a safeguard measure as provided under
the SG.123 However, the SG offers China no remedy in the situation of its
auto market. Indeed, the Chinese markets are going to be flooded with
cheaper, more effective foreign cars, but only at a level already agreed upon at
WTO accession. 124 Therefore, it is nearly impossible to imagine that an inves-
tigation initiated by China under the SG would end in their favor and a safe-
guard would be allowed by the WTO. 125 As a result, any attempt by a local
official to raise tariffs to protect their auto plants will violate the WTO regula-
tions. This type of violation is, at the time of this writing, very common in the
Chinese auto market. 126 Local governments continually impose extra fees and
taxes on non-local cars and in some cases drive the price of foreign cars up by
half.' 27 Upon WTO accession, the competition in the Chinese auto industry
will increase, making it certain that this practice will continue and be applied
against foreign businesses. 1
28
IV. SOLUTIONS
Despite the inevitable compliance problems China will face, it is in the
United States and the world's interest to continually engage China and help
them fully comply with the WTO agreements. The United States can seek to
rectify the problem in two distinct ways. The first is a short-term solution that
allows the United States to protect its trade by using the dispute settlement
120. See SCM Agreement, supra note 50.
121. See May, supra note 3 (observing until now this has primarily been a problem for
Chinese and joint-venture manufactures, but foreign car companies will likely encounter similar
barriers for their imports even as China's national tariff level drops).
122. See generally Paul Mooney, Historic Heroic: Beijing Jeep Rolls Out SUV, at http://
www.chinaonline.com/industry/automotive/NewsArchive/Secure/2000/. . ./c00059050.as (last
modified June 13, 2000). The analyst states the Heroic would not immediately be affected by
competition spurred by China's WTO entry, saying the government would use trade barriers to
discourage any surge in imports that could threaten the local auto industry.
123. See WTO: Trade Topics; The Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 82.
124. See generally May, supra note 3 (noting "[a] highlight of the deal is China's pledge to
reduce its tariffs on foreign autos from the current 80-100 percent level to just 25 percent in
2006").
125. See WTO: Trade Topics; The Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 82.
126. See May, supra note 3.
127. See id.
128. See generally id. (stating that until now it has been the problem for Chinese manufac-
tures, but foreign car companies will encounter similar barriers); see also Top Chinese Trade
Official Says WTO Will Challenge China's Auto Industry, supra note 103 (stating China's auto
industry is still weak in its ability to compete internationally).
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procedures set up by the WTO. 129 The second is a long-term solution that will
help Beijing regain control of its economic policies and transform China into a
fully compliant WTO Member.'
30
A. Short-Term Solution to Non-Compliance
First, the WTO has a fully functioning dispute resolution body
("DRB").' 3' The DRB is charged with seeking positive, mutually acceptable
solutions for problems arising out of international trade.' 32 Using this pro-
cess,1 3 3 the United States could effectively bring its complaint to the WTO and
have the dispute settled.' 34 The DRB sets strict timetables for Members to
answer complaints and will monitor their compliance after the dispute is set-
tled. 135 This process offers the United States a fast, short-term solution to
China's non-compliance. 1
36
B. Long-Term Solution to Non-Compliance
Additionally, the United States must seek to develop a long-term strategy
to help develop China into a fully compliant WTO Member.137 The develop-
ment of many state-run institutions, in effect a larger central government, can
facilitate this goal. ' 3 8 While the creation of new and larger federal agencies is
not a popular aspect of the United States government, it is, nonetheless, an
essential part of its ability to implement policies.' 39 The United States institu-
129. See Mota, supra note 10.
130. See May, supra note 3 (observing that "[o]vercoming this problem will take great effort
by the Chinese authorities and the United States should do what it can-in terms of expertise and
financial resources-to help Beijing eliminate local protectionism").
131. See Mota, supra note 10, at 77.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 78.
A dispute resolution begins when a WTO member requests a consultation with the
DRB and other relevant committees. Any other involved member(s) must enter
into the consultation in good faith. These consultations are confidential. If a dis-
pute is not resolved within sixty days after a request for consultation, the member
bringing a complaint may submit a written request for a panel. The parties may
voluntarily undertake other good offices, conciliation, or mediation, which may
continue even while a panel proceeds.
134. See id. at 77.
135. See id. at 78.
136. See generally id. at 80 ("The Agreement establishing the WTO states that prompt com-
pliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is 'essential to ensure effective resolution
of disputes.' If an offending party fails to implement a ruling, the WTO may request voluntary
compensation from, and/or temporarily suspend concessions that benefit that party.").
137. See May, supra note 3 (observing that "U.S. support for programs to train Chinese
judges, to strengthen central oversight of government contracts, and even establish a special
'WTO compliance center' in Beijing to monitor local governments would serve American, as
well as Chinese, interests").
138. See generally Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, I Love D.C., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at
A29 ("Do you know what the average Chinese would give to have a capital like Washington
today, with its reasonably honest and efficient bureaucracy?").
139. See id.
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tions, its courts, its bureaucracy, and its regulatory agencies make it the envy
of the world, and explain its success in the economic arena. 140 The United
States must work closely with China to help develop such institutions. China
must re-centralization its banks, its courts, 14 1 and most importantly, it must
expand its regulatory agencies.1
4 2
The development of many regulatory agencies within the twenty-three
provinces will help place pressure on the local provincial leaders and thereby
ensure greater WTO compliance.143 Perhaps the most important institution the
United States could help establish is a Beijing WTO compliance center. This
institution would bring the United States and China together and facilitate
communication and cooperation.
V. CONCLUSION
China will certainly have severe problems in complying with WTO regu-
lations. 144 Due to the years of rapid decentralization, Beijing places the fate of
its international trade in the hands of its provincial officials. 145 However, the
seemingly insurmountable obstacles facing the local officials leave them with
only one possible course of action, a course of action that will inevitably lead
to violations of the WTO and strain the Sino-American trade relationship.
146
Indeed, had Mr. Bush actually traveled abroad more than twice he would have
discovered that what foreigners envy us most for is precisely: Washington. That is,
our institutions, our courts, our bureaucracy, our military, and our regulatory agen-
cies-the S.E.C., the federal Reserve, the F.A.A., the F.D.A., the F.B.I., the E.P.A.,
the I.R.S., the I.N.S., the U.S. Patent Office and the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency.
But it is precisely the quality of our government institutions that creates the framework for that
entrepreneurship to flourish.
140. See id. ("His repeated denigration of Washington and government in general manifests
a profound ignorance of what makes America unique in the world today-which happens to be
the strength, quality and, yes, breadth of our government."); see also supra note 81 and accom-
panying text.
141. See May, supra note 3, at 3. "The strengthening of the rule of law is crucial for China's
integration into the world trading system but, again, Beijing's lack of control is a cause for
concern. Prosecutors and judges overwhelmingly favor companies in their district." These bi-
ases in China's legal system will become more prevalent as trade increase because of WTO
membership. "An American bank that will be allowed to conduct business in China may find it
has nowhere to turn when a Chinese company defaults on a loan." Therefore it is imperative
that China restructure and reinforce the legitimacy and power of its court system.
142. See id. (stating it is important that China revamp its regulatory agencies, because along
with decentralization, there are also many other obstacles to China's compliance with WTO
standards). The other obstacles include "rampant corruption, smuggling, bid rigging, and theft
of intellectual property, [which all] can be traced to the erosion of central government authority
and local Communist Party leaders protecting their own financial interests at the expense of
national policy goals."
143. See generally supra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
144. See May, supra note 3, at 1.
145. See supra note 5.
146. See, e.g., id.; see supra notes 7-8.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Still, it is in the best interest of the world, and in particular the United
States, that China continually be engaged and assisted in its compliance with
the WTO standards. 147 Through the use of the DRB and through the develop-
ment of a joint WTO compliance center, the United States can effectively
protect its trade and craft China into a fully compliant Member.' 48 Then, the
access and utilization of the Chinese market sought by the West throughout
history will finally come to fruition.
Gregory Fennell
147. See May, supra note 3 ("In short, China's integration into WTO is too important to let it
be undermined by rapacious and/or protectionist local cadres.").
148. See supra note 11.
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